Readers of the last issue of the IGS Newletter (No.9, March 1999, pp.19-26) may have noted my somewhat critical review of Diana Coben's attempt to profile the importance of the writings of Antonio Gramsci and Paulo Freire to the field of adult education (Radical Heroes: Gramsci, Freire and the Politics of Adult Education. New York: Garland Publishing, 1998). Interestingly, not twelve months later, yet another volume devoted to Gramsci and Freire and adult education has subsequently been published. Advertising a similar theme to that portrayed in Coben's study--that of attempting to contribute towards the development of theoretical and pedagogical possibilities for transformative action--Peter Mayo's analysis, happily, appears to offer a much more authentic examination of the ideas of both these theorists. In so far as Mayo shows none of the overt reticence towards adopting a socialist stance that was so evident in Coben's work, his up-front, positive valuation of the tripartite concepts of social, political and economic justice to educational thinking allows him much more power to apply the critical insights which a Gramscian/Freirean interpretation of Marxism genuinely has to offer. For, as I argued previously in the Coben review, this was precisely the problem with her analysis: the advancement of an expansion of "democratic possibilities" through the lens of poststructuralism did not ultimately allow her to critique the logic of 'capital' itself. Unequal social relationships could be fought against and rectified by a "deepening of democracy," but Coben's very construal of democracy was defined purely as individualistic liberal supports--gains brought about through treaties or contracts framed solely within a language of rights (as opposed to those gains being grounded in ethical concerns). Having assumed that capitalism was therefore a "given," her analysis was one which essentially retained the full flavour of an existing and globalised capitalist rationality. The net result, invariably, was that whilst localised equity gains might well be made, the residual and destructive effects of the systemic roots of capitalism would never be fully targeted for direct elimination.
By contrast, Mayo seems to appreciate this point and begins to charter the effects of this given right from the outset. Focussing directly on globalised capital, he notes the shift in the conceptual landscape of adult education sympomatic of the impact of neoliberal imperatives; the [END PAGE 17] evolution of a predominantly technical-rational focus within the sub-discipline whereby even the classical liberal foundations of education have been rearticulated to support an agenda of economic pragmatism. Noteworthy, too (and contra Coben), is Mayo's conviction that the added infusion of postmodern thinking within much of the contemporary adult education debate has further diluted the overall commitment to social justice as a primary feature of educational commitment per se. The collusion of a globalised, economic rationality coupled thus with a weaker, more localised conception of social justice, has, in effect, created an impasse which has effectively precluded the generation of new and innovative transformative initiatives. And this is precisely where the contribution of the lifework of Antonio Gramsci and Paulo Freire lies, Mayo is maintaining. What both theorists promote is nothing less than a robust and positive vision of education's role with regard to social amelioration. The task of synthesizing what each theorist has to contribute to ensure that a broader concept of social justice is brought back into the adult education arena is therefore very much the principal objective of Mayo's study. For the purposes of this review, I want especially to focus on how Mayo depicts Gramsci's contribution. Mindful of the reductionistic emphasis which so marred Coben's treatment of Gramsci, I was wary as to whether Mayo, too, could be charged with committing transgressions of a similar nature. In particular, did he succeed in accurately capturing the leitmotiv of Gramsci's work, and, if so, how did Mayo apply these understandings to contemporary adult education initiatives?
Mayo's lengthy introduction provides a rich discussion of the phenomenon of globalisation which aptly serves to vindicate Gramsci's stance on how the entire terrain of our educational and cultural activity is intimately connected with the political and economic climate of the age. In this regard, he makes a feature of highlighting how Gramsci portrays the underpinnings of "hegemony" as those which necessarily always involve an educational relationship; whereby, by implication, institutions operating within civil society and those agents (intellectuals) associated with them tend, more often than not, to endorse the ideology of capitalism (albeit this is usually an unconscious and unwitting corroboration). To the extent that this political and economic quiescence is then the norm, the net outcome is all too predictably that such sites play little, if any, major role in advocating for significant social transformation. That is, most mainstream institutions and agents working within them passively acquiese to the perpetuation of the ongoing cycle of economic/class inequality. In as much as Mayo also draws attention to the highly contingent relationship always prevalent between agenda setting and funding support--a relationship which is itself dramatically symptomatic of the symbiotic relationship between the civil network and capital--he deduces that conventional (formal/institutional) adult educational initiatives will invariably display a conservative tendency. Consequently, Mayo's advice is that all adult educators, particularly those operating in formal (mainstream) settings, must subject their own theory and practice to vigorous interrogation and sustained critique. An understanding of the Gramscian concept of hegemony thus brings with it the [END PAGE 18] realisation that no pedagogical activity is ever neutral. All educational activity therefore needs to be thoroughly examined for signs of complicity with anti-liberatory practice.
Mayo acknowledges that this is by no means an easy task, the danger being that the lines can easily become blurred as to what exactly constitutes effective counter-hegemonic practice. Here, Gramsci's concept of the organic intellectual is especially valuable, juxtaposed, as it should be, against this vision of a politicised civil society. The role of the organic intellectual is essentially, then, a political one: that is, it is a role which requires the constant modelling of self-reflective practice and the initiation of social critique as a vital component of Gramsci's "war of position." Illuminating the possibilities available to enable subaltern groups to engage in effective power- sharing initiatives therefore entails that the adult educator work across a number of cultural sites with a variety of groups. Accordingly, "education" is certainly not confined to formal encounters but is to be viewed as synonymous instead with "cultural struggle." As Mayo also urges, "hegemony" presupposes the need for a strong sense of intervention on the part of the adult educator, a move which further underscores the need for active human agency as a necessary catalyst for self-activity (self-agency) among the marginalised and dispossessed. Deducing from Gramsci's factory council experience that for such local activity to be effective, it must also be connected ultimately to an international alliance of movements--an "international historical bloc" (pp.176-77)--Mayo then observes that the arena of industrial production constitutes an important, contemporary and increasingly globalised site of social-change-oriented educational activity. Indeed, as perhaps the most obvious site, still, where issues of economic injustice generally surface, Mayo reasons that the "democratisation of relations in the sphere of production" represents a key strategy in the "democratisation of wider social relations," in general (p.47). And what Mayo means by democratisation is clearly the establishment of reciprocal educational relationships (basically, a "collaboration" between individuals at a site), a theme which serves as an appropriate introduction to Freire's work.
Of perhaps the greatest import with regard to Freire's contribution is that it informs the "how" of the Gramscian vision of more democratic social relations. In particular, Freire's pedagogy serves to illuminate how the politicisation of individuals is to occur: how they are to undergo the transition from a state of submersion within (and therefore submission to) the dominant culture to take an active role in the shaping of both their own destinies and that of their culture. Well rehearshing the key components of Freire's liberatory pedagogy throughout his book--the focus being on the role of critical dialogue as a key constituent of an anti-banking, anti-hierarchical and politicising pedagogy--Mayo's synopsis undoubtedly succeeds in offering the reader a valuable overview, nonetheless. Overall, that Mayo finds in favour of a complementarity between the ideas of Gramsci and Freire, I feel is well argued--albeit somewhat repetitious, given the formulaic layout of the chapters (an ongoing reiteration of themes of social relations, sites of practice, and the content of [END PAGE 19] adult education). Where I would beg to differ from Mayo's assessment, however, is in the degree of overlap between these two thinkers, which Mayo is perhaps inclined to understate. It could be argued that a very different, more coherent account of the work of each theorist would have emerged had Mayo been inclined to put a heavier accent on the Marxist epistemology which underscores many of the concepts discussed and shared by these two theorists (see, for example, Allman 1999). One such concept is that of "praxis'" for instance. In relation to Gramsci's use of that term, for example, to elucidate all those cultural practices that were essentially "captive" to bourgeois production and to map those same features (i.e. as the effects of proletarian inactivity, correspondingly), was Gramsci's visible engagement in praxis. Praxis, as it were, was Gramsci's integral political method which epitomised the primary lesson of Marx: whereby philosophical activity was directed towards a consciously political and moral end--the unification of thought and activity to restore humanity's creative/human nature. However, as Mayo himself is at pains to admit, his study is very much an initial attempt at a synthesis. Many impressions are deserving of further reflection and refinement.
As stated above, however, Mayo's study is certainly a sound effort at attempting to re-couple education to a conception of justice that does not simply pay lip-service to inequality by attempting the alleviation of social/cultural/political disadvantage without being mindful that the Gramscian notion of "integral politics" portrays disadvantage and non-recognition equally as having material roots. In this regard, whilst the purpose of struggle is undoubtedly to change the composition of societies to more acutely reflect the connectedness that ought to exist between human lives and to accentuate the myriad of potentially creative forms of human life and expression which are presently curtailed by the prevailing positivistic logic of capitalist rationality, it would be wrong to represent this struggle chiefly (or solely) as an intellectual struggle. Whilst Mayo quite possibly doesn't mean to do so, to my mind at least, his privileging of an abbreviated definition of hegemony (courtesy of David Livingston, p.35), does tend to engender this very outcome. As a result, although Mayo consistently reiterates a pedagogy within which dialogue and discussion greatly serve to politicise a population to action, my own view is that the primary purpose of such dialogue is to elicit empathy, trust and moral respect among differently positioned individuals and groups in order that such reflection and action would ultimately become morally grounded. Indeed, my own preference is to accentuate the moral dimension of the transformation that needs to occur; that is, if transformation is ever to be authentic and for the ensuing relationships within that society to be in any way different to those which would have prevailed previously.
To my mind, the key lesson we can learn from both Gramsci and Freire is that if education isn't a moral enterprise, then education is simply not occurring. Something else is. One could call this other activity/outcome by several names: indoctrination, mis-education, dehumanisation, alienation or domestication. What all of these terms have in common, however, is that education is [END PAGE 20] absent by virtue of the fact that there is no alliance between education and morality. Therefore, it is Gramsci and Freire's concept of "moral education" which is urgently needing explication in order to consolidate our contemporary political theorising. Indeed, without esteeming education primarily as a moral enterprise, we are left with only the softest possible grounds upon which to make those important judgements which crucially affect the manner in which we conduct ourselves and associate with others.
Whilst Mayo is all too well aware of the primary failings which plague most of the theorising within the educational domain, he unfortunately fails to paint these shortcomings outwardly in moral terms. And although he does acknowledge the danger inherent in the attempts that have gone on to domesticate the concept of education itself--either by being conceptually defined (confined) to an engagement of a purely formal and utilitarian or vocational nature, or by the concept simply being equated with the overall outcome of all our learning experiences--he does not appear to clearly grasp that a common defence of each reduction is the ethical objection. To illustrate my point, the challenge against the tendency that has recently become manifest within educational institutions towards adopting more positivistic means of assessing "educational" progress (intervention justified in the name of efficiency gains) is surely translated as a movement away from recognising the human and relational aspect of education. Education is no longer considered holistically as a rich and rewarding interaction, but is now viewed predominantly as just another another commodity transaction (see Jarvis 1995). The need for an ethical defence of education is perhaps more self-evident in the second type of reductionism; whereby education collapses into any form of socialisation imaginable. Our objection, in this circumstance, should be levelled against any individual or group being able to justify or legitimate their own (often harmful) partisan practices in the name of education. In so far as Gramsci was keenly aware of this tactic with regard to the bourgeoisie justifying its own perverse form of rationality based upon its perceived needs within the production process, his own campaign of attempting to reappropriate language (key words and phrases) attested to his never-ending efforts to humanise such concepts and to enlist them back into the service of a common humanity ("culture" is perhaps the best known, but so, too, was "education" targeted). The struggle to develop a new form of hegemony was, above all, a moral struggle; one to be fought at the level of the intellect but involving ultimately a battle of ethical principles. The contemporary battle that we are fighting is essentially the same battle which both theorists fought. It is fundamentally a battle which entails the reconstruction of a truly "civic" ethic underpinned by a genuine moral attachment and a commitment to each other (and, importantly, an appreciation that this commitment extends to ourselves as well, to the extent that we privilege certain perceptions as to how we ought to live as human beings). In this respect, the problem of hegemony truly is a relational one, as Gramsci consistently intimated. For my own part, phrases such as a [END PAGE 21] "deepening of democracy" or "radical democracy" will take us nowhere further forward along the pathway towards achieving "authentic democracy" unless the deep-seated moral implications of this relational requirement are noted and, indeed, fully comprehended. Whilst I am therefore only too willing to acknowledge that the causes of the new social movements have certainly heightened our awareness of the extent to which our liberatory endeavours should be broadly directed, sadly, and all too often, political resolutions in this language involve nothing more than a shallower form of the recognition of what it is to be "human," settled by treaty or through contract. Important, much more fundamentally "human" ways of relating together subsequently become subordinate to a single form of rationality--essentially one which is strictly procedural in nature. It is these appeals to agnostic ways of living and acting, in the name of "justice," "rights"--or even "education"--which thus ironically serve to "demoralise" human relationships even further (see Bauman 1997: especially chapter 4).
The task requires that we expose and promote the ethical dimension of education which might engender the capability needed to corrode the civil supports affirming the "naturalistic" economic base of our present 'anti-social' settlement (see McLaren 1998). But this by no means entails a call to ignore difference and diversity in the name of some type of homogeneous, totalitarian politics. Rather, what it does nominate is a restoration of the politics of human agency; a view of agency (and a deep understanding of the ideological constraints acting upon agency) which is, however, much more robust than that epitomised principally as 'worker solidarity' or 'worker collaboration' at the level of "industrial democracy." To my mind, at least, it is a call for the replacement of the self which Bauman referred to as the "morally disarmed self" (1993: p.248) with a self which has both an interest and a capability in re-shaping the society in which it engages. "Liberating" rather than "domesticating" relational involvement--the development of a "social consciousness"--thus constitutes the essence of genuine educational praxis of the Gramscian/Freirean kind, as I see it. Reflection and action (thought and behaviour) is therefore morally grounded to enable us to strive towards an authentic politics of hope. This is the moral dimension of reform which Gramsci and Freire both exhorted should be the goal to which we focus all our educational endeavours. The recognition of other people's misery and suffering as one's own responsibility is no less than justice educated--educated precisely by injustice. And this must truly be the most radical form of democratic expression possible.
References
Allman, Paula (1999). Revolutionary Social Transformation: Democratic Hopes, Political Possibilities and Critical Education. Westport, Connecticut and London: Bergin & Garvey.
Bauman, Z. (1993). Postmodern Ethics. Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell.
Bauman, Z. (1997). Postmodernity and Its Discontents. New York: New York University Press..
Jarvis, Peter (1995). Teachers and Learners in Adult Education: Transaction or Moral Interaction? Studies in the Education of Adults, 27, 1, 24-35, April.
McLaren, Peter (1998). Revolutionary Pedagogy in Post-Revolutionary Times: Rethinking the Political Economy of Critical Education. Educational Theory, 48, 4, 431-462, Fall.